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Zusammenfassung
Im Mai 1978 ereignete sich ein Wassereinbruch im AVR. Der Reaktor war abge-
schaltet und wurde durch Zwangsumlauf gekühlt. Wasser drang aus einem über-
hitzerleck in den Primärkreislauf ein, verdampfte beim Durchgang durch das
Core und kondensierte im unteren Teil des Primärkreislaufs und im Bereich
des Kugelabzugs.
Im Wasser wurden verschiedene Spaltprodukt-Aktivitäten von den Wissenschaft-
lern des AVR gemessen. Eine Studie wurde begonnen, um die Quellen der Akti-
vitäten zu identifizieren und Informationen zu gewinnen, die allgemein bei
der Analyse von Wassereinbruch-Störfällen benutzt werden können.
Der erste Teil dieser Studie ist in diesem Bericht dargestellt. Die möglichen
Aktivitätsquellen werden einzeln betrachtet und ihre Beiträge abgeschätzt,
wobei Daten aus früheren Laborexperimenten - soweit möglich - herangezogen
wurden.
Das Hauptergebnis ist, daß wertvolle Informationen hinsichtlich der Desorp-
tion von Jod, Cäsium und Strontium von dem Staub und den Oberflächen des
Primärkreislaufs gewonnen worden sind. Es wurde ein Minimal-Programm von
Messungen und analytischen Arbeiten erstellt, die notwendig sind, um diese
Informationen zu ergänzen. Ein Beispiel der Anwendung dieser Daten auf einen
speziellen Leistungsreaktor-Störfall wird gegeben, um zu zeigen, wie diese
Informationen die Berechnung der Auswirkungen beeinflussen kann.
Für den zweiten Teil der Studie sind bessere Abschätzungen der Spaltprodukt-
Konzentrationen im Primärkreislauf vor dem Unfall sowie verschiedene Mes-
sungen erforderlich, die auszuführen sind, wenn der Reaktor wieder in
Betrieb ist.
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Summary
An ingress of water occurred in the AVR reactor in May 1978. The reactor
had been shut down and cooled by forced circulation; liquid water entered
the primary circuit from a leak in the superheater, evaporated in passing
through the core and condensed in the lower part of the primary circuit
and in the ball handling region.
Various fission product activities were measured in the water by the AVR
scientists and a study was started to identify the sources of these
activities and to derive information which could be used in the analyses
of water ingress accidents in general.
The first part of this study is reported in this note. The possible source
terms are considered separately and estimates of their contributions are
made, supported by data from previous laboratory experiments where possible.
The main conclusion is that valuable information has been derived concerning
the desorption of iodine, caesium and strontium from dust and primary
circuit surfaces. A minimum programme of measurements and analytical work
necessary to increase this information has been identified. An example
of the application of the data to a particular accident to a power reactor
is given to indicate how the information can affect the calculation of
consequences.
For the second part of the study, better estimates of the fission product
concentrations in the primary circuit prior to the accident and various
measurements when the reactor is operating again are required.
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Information from the Water Ingress Accident on AVR
1. Objectives
In principle, data derived from the water ingress accident can provide
unique information in the following areas:
- the transport of heavy metal oxides or carbides by corrosion or
leaching mechanisms;
- the effect of abnormal water concentrations on fission products
external to the coated particles i.e. fission products deposited in
the graphite of the fuel elements, on dust or on circuit surfaces;
- the effect of water on defective fuel particles.
Currently the available experimental data in these areas are sparse
and large differences exist in the assumptions used in analysing the
effects of water ingress. For example, in the Accident Initiation and
Progression Analysis carried out by the General Atomic Company (1),
no account was taken of the possibility that steam could cause des-
orption or wash-off of fission products deposited on primary circuit
surfaces. On the other hand, a prediction made at KFA (2) of the
release of activities from the AVR following steam ingress includes
an assumption that 50 % of the metallic fission products and 80 % of
the iodines deposited in the primary circuit would desorb immediately.
This difference in treatment can change the contribution to the risk
from water ingress accidents from negligible to significant levels
particularly because the deposits of long-lived metallic fission products
increase throughout the life of the reactor.
The information from the AVR accident cannot be precise because the
conditions were not under control but at least gross assumptions can
be examined, order of magnitude estimates can be deduced and in some
areas certain effects can be eliminated.
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2. Sources of Fission Products
The course of the accident was an injection of water in the liquid phase
from a superheater tube over several days which evaporated in passing
through the sub-critical core and condensed in the ball handling region
and the lower part of the primary circuit. Various fission product
activities were measured in this water (3); the results are reproduced
in Table 1.
The possible sources of these activities are:
2.1 - removal of fission products from defective fuel particles;
2.2 - corrosion of core graphite containing fission products;
2.3 - leaching of fission products from fuel balls submerged in water;
2.4 - leaching or desorption of fission products from the graphite of
fuel balls in the core;
2.5 - leaching or desorption of fission products from dust or graphite
fragments;
2.6 - wash-off or desorption of fission products deposited on primary
circuit surfaces;
2.7 - exchange of tritium adsorbed on graphite.
3. Estimates of the Source Terms
3.1 B§i]]ova]of Sol ubl eFi ssionProductsf rgmDef §ctiyeParticles
There was no trace of the gamma activities which would be directly
associated with damaged fuel particles.
These activities include: proto-actinium 233, cerium 141/144,
zirconium/niobium 95, ruthenium 103/106.
These species have low diffusion coefficients relative to caesium or
barium and do not migrate in normal operation from the immediate
neighbourhood of the fuel kernels. A direct experiment to test the
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transport of fission products was made by exposing irradiated fuel
compacts to high steam concentrations at 1250° C until the compacts
disintegrated (4). Several of these species were detected together
with caesium, iodine and xenon even though the defective particle
-5fraction was as low as 10 .
The absence of these activities in the AVR water indicates that damaged
fuel particles can be eliminated as a dominant source term for the
metallic isotopes - which is an important conclusion when the extremely
small fraction of released fission products is considered in comparison
with the total inventory in the core.
3 • 2 Corrosign_of_Fuel_E1ement_Graphite
Any corrosion which occurred during the passage of steam through the
core was in the chemical regime because the graphite temperatures did
not exceed 500 C. The steam concentration was uniform throughout the
fuel element material and any corrosion was uniformly distributed.
The weight loss has been estimated by Moormann (5) assuming a water
concentration of 6000 vpm for 15 days with all the core graphite at
500 C and the reactor pressure at 10 bar.
-4 -2The predicted weight loss was 0.8 x 10 mg cm , i.e. the fictional
equivalent weight loss if all the corroded graphite had been removed
from the surface. This is important because the caesium and strontium
concentrations have been found to be higher at the surfaces of fuel
balls with high burn-up than in the interior (6, 7). Therefore any
estimates based on surface corrosion will be upper limits. The measure-
ments made on a fuel element which had received a burn-up of 17.6 %
fima show surface concentrations of strontium 90 of 1 x 10 atoms/gram
14graphite and of caesium 137 of 2 x 10 atoms/gram graphite.
If these are assumed pessimistically to be the surface concentrations
throughout the core then the expected maximum removal of strontium 90
activity is given:
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17 7
A = 10 x 4TTr N x m x X curies
3.7 x 10 1 0
N = number of fuel elements in the core (10 )
r ball radius cm
m = mass of graphite removed per unit
-2
surface area gem
^ = decay constant sec
giving A = 1.8 mil 1i Curies
and for caesium 137,
A = 3.4 micro Curies.
The ac t iv i t ies released by corrosion of the fuel elements are therefore
negligible.
3
-3 Leaching_of_Fission_Products_from_Submerged^Fuel
The specific ac t iv i t ies of caesium 134, caesium 137 and strontium 90
in the water contained in the 4 control rod guide tubes and in the
water covering the discharged fuel were the same within experimental
error. These two quantities of water were separated by the guide-tubes
up to the top of the fuel discharge tube. Therefore the submerged fuel
elements in the fuel discharge system did not contribute to the release
of metallic f iss ion products. This also means that the dissolving by
l iquid water of active species adsorbed or diffused into graphite is
a long term process. There is qualitative confirmation from reported
measurements of f ission products leached from irradiated fuel balls
stored in a sealed can into which water leaked over a period of about
one year (8) . The measured removal of caesium 137 was 380 p Ci from
49 balls stored in the can, corresponding to a removal fraction of
approximately 4 x 10" . Applying this fract ion to the 5000 balls in
the discharge system, the expected removal of caesium 137 would be
about 60 mCi, with no allowance for time dependence of so lub i l i ty .
The caesium and strontium act iv i t ies from this source are therefore
negligible.
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3.4 Removal of Fission Products from the Fuel Element Graphite by
Because the water passed through the core as saturated steam at 500° C,
any signif icant release of f ission products from the fuel elements
would be a desorption process affected by the high water concentration.
In dry helium the desorption rates of caesium and strontium from
graphite at 500° C are negligible. For caesium, for example, the level
14of 2 x 10 atoms/gram graphite corresponds to a concentration of
0.05 fj gm caesium/gram graphite. At this concentration, the adsorption
isotherm is Langmuir and the evaporation rate would correspond to a
-18part ial pressure o f ^ l O bar i .e. approximately 10 atoms caesium
3/cm helium (relat ively t r i v i a l ) .
There is no reported evidence of the effect of steam on caesium diffused
into graphite. Experiments, however, were made to determine the
catalytic affects of caesium, barium and strontium on the corrosion
rates of graphite in steam at 25 mbar and at temperatures between
700° and 1000° C (9). The metal loadings were higher than those of the
AVR graphite by orders of magnitude but no displacement of those metals
was observed. This is only a qualitative indication that fission
product metals which have diffused into graphite may not be affected
by steam. Further evidence is necessary to determine the relative
importance of this source term, particularly with respect to strontium.
3.5 L§§^!]iD9
3.5.1 Iodine
Within the information available, desorption from dust and from circuit
surfaces cannot reliably be distinguished and these two sources are
discussed together.
The equilibrium concentration of iodine 131 in the AVR core (46 MW.)
6 -5
is 1.3 x 10 curies. Assuming an effective R/B of 10 and a plate-out
4
factor of 10 , which are typical for an HTR, the equilibrium
concentrations in the coolant and on the circuit surfaces would be
1.3 mCi and 13 Ci respectively. No iodine remains in the core graphite.
- 6 -
The adsorption isotherm for iodine on the AVR boiler steel shows that
less than 1 % of the plated-out iodine would be deposited on the super-
heater section, and wash-off by water had, therefore, little effect.
The gas-borne activity was negligible and the majority of the iodine
measured in the water must have been desorbed from the primary circuit
surfaces and dust downstream of the superheater.
The fraction desorbed in a helium/steam mixture can be estimated from
the results of experiments made at ORNL (10). Müller (11) has derived
the desorption equation:
AH«n^K (*) = Ap.O. (°) -A
where A. . (t) is the time dependent desorption of
iodine activity in Ci.
A (o) is the plated-out activity of iodine
at time zero in Ci.
X decay constant of iodine sec"
K . iodine desorption coefficient sec
Inserting the values of K derived from the ORNL experients and extra-
polating to the temperature conditions during the AVR accident, the
desorbed fraction at 100 hours is 80 %, which is in good agreement with
the desorption fraction assumed by von der Decken et al. (2).
However, the estimated level of iodine 131 in the AVR primary circuit
immediately prior to the water ingress is 10 Ci (12) and the measured
activity in the water was 1.4 Ci, corresponding to a desorption factor
of only 14 %.
It is therefore important to check the core release rate and the circuit
inventory of iodine prior to the accident.
3.5.2 Caesium
An approximate estimate of the caesium 137 activity in the circuit
immediately prior to the ingress is 20 Ci, based on the estimated level
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of von der Decken (2) and the integrated release from fuel failures sub-
sequent to that level given by Maly et al. (13). The measured release
of 1.8 Ci would then correspond to a desorption fraction of 9 %.
Wahl and Jacobsen (3) have pointed out that the Cs 137 / Cs 134 activity
ratio in the water (1.84) corresponds more closely to the ratio found
in the dust filtered from the gas (2.08) than to the ratio,measured on
fuel element surfaces (1.24). No reliable estimate of the desorption
factor can be made until a calculation of the levels and distributions
of the caesium isotopes in the AVR circuit prior to the accident has been
carried out, based on Vampyr loop measurements.
3.5.3 Strontium
The high level of strontium 90 activity in the water represents the
most important measurement of the incident. The Sr 90 / Sr 89 ratio of
100 indicates an abnormally high release of strontium occurring 3 - 4
years ago. This is supported qualitatively by the strontium concentration
profiles on high burn-up fuel balls where the internal diffusion profiles
represent the history of the individual ball and the profiles from the
surface inward represent the history of the reactor.
As for caesium, a desorption factor cannot be estimated until a calculation
of the strontium concentrations in the primary circuit has been made.
3.6 Tritium
The measured concentrations of tritium in normal operation are
_q -3 -4 3
3 x 10 Ci/N cm in the helium and 3 x 10 Ci/cm in the graphite of
both fuel elements and graphite balls (15), leading to estimated tritium
inventories in the graphite of the core and of the submerged balls of
3400 Ci and 170 Ci respectively. Approximately 20 % of this tritium was
accessible for an immediate exchange with hydrogen in the water; above this
fraction, a temperature dependent diffusion process is rate limiting and
at the temperatures of the fuel elements during the accident, no further
significant contribution from the fuel graphite and none from the coated
particles is to be expected.
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This source would therefore account for about 700 - 800 Ci of the 2900 Ci
measured in the water and if an exchange model with a maximum of 20 %
accessible tritium is used to account for the remaining 2200 Ci, a reservoir
of the order of at least 10 000 Ci must be assumed on the reflector and
structural graphite.
The distribution model proposed by ORNL for evaluation of the Fort St. Vrain
measurements (16) includes the following assumptions:
- that 50 - 70 % of tritium produced in the coolant from He 3 is chemi-
sorbed on graphite,
- that all the tritium produced by Li 6 (n,<) reactions is retained within
the graphite.
The He 3 source in AVR produces not more than 100 Ci/a and probably closer
to 50 Ci/a which would account for 300 - 500 Ci of chemi-sorbed tritium.
The production in the graphite must be a guess because the lithium and
boron concentrations are not known. However, the measurements made on a
Dragon reflector block showed a tritium concentration of 120 \x Ci/g at
the inner surface, diminishing to 50 u Ci/g at 5 cm depth (17). A wery
approximate extrapolation of this profile to the AVR reflector allowing
for the different neutron dose leads to an estimated total of 1500 Ci
for a Li 6 impurity concentration similar to that of the Dragon block
i.e. 0.03 p.p.m. If the lithium impurity is as high as 0.3 p.p.m., a
tritium reservoir of 10 000 - 15 000 Ci in AVR is a possibility from this
source.
The necessary work to justify these estimates are:
- measurements-of the lithium concentration in AVR reflector graphite,
- measurement of the tritium levels in the fuel free zone of elements
now in the core,
- injections of hydrogen during operation to measure the tritium now
accessible for exchange,
- more rigorous calculations of the tritium inventories prior to the
accident.
- 9 -
This data will be valuable for the calculation of tritium balances in the
THTR and in the advanced reactors.
4. Application of the Data to Accident Analyses
The application of the data from AVR is best shown by taking an example.
In the Phase II Report of the AIPA Study (14), a water ingress accident
is analysed in which the risk of introducing a design option to reduce
cost is estimated. The design option involves the elimination of dump
tanks so that the steam generator inventory is released directly to the
atmosphere, by-passing the containment. The risk relates to the failure
to close this by-pass line after dumping the steam, thus causing a
depressurization of the reactor direct to atmosphere. The concern here
is not with the probability of the event but with the consequences.
The fission product source terms are shown in Table 2 for three cases:
- the values used in the AIPA Study
. - the values modified by assuming a 15 % desorption factor for strontium,
caesium and iodine (which might be the outcome from AVR)
- the values modified by assuming a 50 % desorption factor for strontium
and caesium and 80 % for iodine (which are the assumptions used by
von der Decken et al. (2)).
Taking account only of the increased contribution to the release of
iodine 131, the effect on the 30 day thyroid dose is an increase from
1 rem to 15 rem (taking 15 % desorption) and to about 70 rem (taking
80 % desorption). The latter figure may be pessimistic but is much
closer to the reality of the AVR accident than the assumption of AIPA.
The list of source terms also underlines a further effect which would
be apparent when the AVR reactor is re-started. This is the possible
reaction of steam with defective carbide fuel. This reaction transforms
uranium and thorium carbides to the oxides, and if enough steam is
present, hydrate molecules can be attached to the oxides. This hydro-
lysis causes a swelling of the particles and the release of gaseous
fission products. Hydrolysis is zero above 700 C and increases with
decreasing temperature (14). In the conditions of the AVR accident,
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any defective carbide fuel is likely to have been hydrolysed and it is
necessary to operate the reactor at full power and at the prior
temperatures in order to measure any overall increase in fission gas
release.
5. Proposals for Further Work
The two areas of information which can be of direct value to accident
analyses of HTR systems are:
- the desorption factors for iodine and metallic fission products,
- the extent of hydrolysis of defective carbide fuel.
The tasks required to obtain these data are:
- the estimation from Vampyr loop data of the levels and distribution
of activities deposited on primary circuit surfaces and on dust
immediately prior to the accident including in particular:
caesium 134 strontium 89
caesium 137 strontium 90
silver 110m iodine 131
- the measurement of individual rare gas isotopes in the coolant as a
function of time when the reactor is operating at the same conditions
as those immediately prior to the accident for which gas activity
measurements are available for isotope-to-isotope comparison.
Other information which would be of value in understanding transport
mechanisms include:
- check of the Cs 134 / Cs 137 and Sr 89 / Sr 90 ratios in activities
deposited on any primary circuit component which may be removed for
inspection. Also, the same ratios for dust samples if these are taken
from the circuit;
- a direct experiment on high burn-up balls removed from the reactor
several months after re-start to determine the desorption factors of
strontium 90 and 89 from fuel ball surfaces in a saturated steam
atmosphere at temperatures from 500° C to 700° C. This is probably
specific to AVR fuel because the strontium loadings reported
(15 ^u gram Sr / gram graphite) is abnormally high;
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- injection of hydrogen when the reactor is at power to check tr i t ium
release per mol of injected hydrogen;
- post-irradiation examination of fuel with carbide kernels for hydro-
lysis damage;
- post-irradiation examination of t r i t ium levels in fuel ball graphite
from balls now in the reactor core;
- post-irradiation examination for any signif icant changes in surface
concentrations and profi les in the fuel-free zone of fuel balls now
in the core compared.to previous measurements;
- check of any change of the f ission gas release levels immediately
before and after the injection of 8 kg of water in March 1978.
6. Conclusions
The water ingress accident on AVR has provided unique information with
regard to the sources of fission products which must be considered in
the analysis of such accidents for HTR's.
It has been shown that upper limit estimates can be made for these
sources and that several can be eliminated. In other cases, further work
is required to reduce the uncertainties of the size of the contributions.
In particular the removal of strontium from dust, from primary circuit
surfaces or from fuel element graphite cannot be defined with confidence
on present information.
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